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ABSTRACT
An analysis was conducted on the strategies implemented by Black-owned banks (BOBs) to service
the credit needs of their communities. The analysis was based on financial statements from annual
reports, regulatory agencies, and studies on the subject of banking in communities of color.
Commonly used accounting and finance measures were used to evaluate the relative performance
and risk exposure of the BOBs and their peers. The results from the analysis revealed that BOBs
loaned less and invested more of their assets than their peers. Although the BOBs faced lower
demand for their services and increased competition, they achieved superior profitability compared
to their peers in 1992.
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Chapter One
Background of Black-Owned Banks (BOBs)
There are currently 77 Black-owned and/or Black-operated financial service companies in
the U.S. Most of the Black-owned banks (BOBs) which consist of both savings and commercial
banks are located in urban areas where unemployment rates are higher and income levels are lower
than the national averages. While the largest of these banks are financially stable, the group as a
whole is vulnerable to economic downswings because of their customer base. When the general
economy improves, the Black nation has tended to be slow in reaping the benefits. But, when the
economy trends down, this population segment is first to suffer from the negative effects and at
disproportionately larger levels.
Beginning in the early 1900s, BOBs emerged in the South to fulfill the credit needs of
minority communities which were unable to obtain banking services the majority community.
During the Civil Rights era of the 1960s and 1970s, a second wave of BOB emerged (Cline, 1990).
Traditionally, BOBs have been conservative and slow to adopt innovative marketing or new
technologies. In general, from the 1900s to today, the growth of these institutions has been stunted
by their economically vulnerable customer base, the counterproductive effects of desegregation,
and the rapidly changing financial services industry.
The most recent challenges to the viability of BOBs comes from the Federal government's
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the emergence of non-banking competitors. The
federally enforced CRA has forced many mainstream banks to offer credit services to minority
communities creating new competitors and tightening margins for BOBs. In Boston,
Massachusetts for example, within two years after establishing a community banking division
within Boston's predominately 'hiinority" community, Bank of Boston held over $250 million in
deposits while the area's only BOB which had been serving the same community for the prior ten
years held only $75 million in deposits (Wilkerson and Williams, 1993). Non-banking firms such
as check cashing stores have also taken market share from BOBs within this target market.
The desegregation era of the 1960s and the CRA movement begun in the late 1980s
completely changed the nature of banking in Black communities. Once monopolists, the BOBs
have been slow in responding to the competitive pressures of new entrants into their target area.
Given the right to choose, many Blacks, after desegregation no longer did business with their local
BOB. Also, many of the larger mainstream banks found that they do have the ability to earn
profits from the Black customer base they had long ignored. BOBs suffered as demand for their
services declined while the threats from their new competitors increased.
In addition to BOB specific challenges, the banking and thrift industries, in general, have
been changing quite rapidly over the last ten years. The changes are as a result of deregulation,
globalization of capital markets, and greater interest-rate volatility. Since the last decade, banks
have been trending towards consolidation through 'hiassive restructuring" which has resulted in an
increase in merger, acquisition, and divestiture activities as well as a rise in internal restructuring
(Copeland et al., 1994).
Analysis : Comparison Between the BOBs and Their Peers
Minority-owned banks in general, and BOBs in particular were created to meet the credit
needs of the "disenfranchised" minority community. For many generations, the community BOB
was the only lending source available to Blacks, outside of family and friends. Prior to the Civil
Rights' desegregation policies, BOBs enjoyed a monopolistic relationship within their service
areas. Today, BOBs battle in a highly competitive industry dominated by technologically superior
and better capitalized competitors. As of year end 1992, there were 19 BOBs with assets between
$50 to $350 million dollars. Only one bank held assets valued at over $300 million. The
combined asset value of these top BOBs was $2.4 billion, averaging $126 million per bank (Hayes,
1994). Only two of the 19 banks are located outside of the nation's 15 largest metropolitan areas.
While the number of BOBs are few, they have thousands of competitors. Also in 1992, there were
45 other minority-owned banks and 4,741 mainstream (non-white owned) banks within the asset
value range of $50 to $300 million (Federal Reserve Bank, 1992).
Table 1. Selected Assets & Liabilities of the BOBs, Other Minority-Owned, and Majority
Banks in the Asset Size Range of $50 to $300 Million*
Company Assets Loans Loans/Assets Deposits Deposits/Assets
Average of 126,032 69,045 51.77% 108,867 88.15%
Top 19 BOBs
Ave.Majority 111,461 60,364 54.16% 98,178 88.08%
Bank I I I
Average 105,917 57,573 54.36% 95,468 90.13%
Minority Bank I
* Carver Federal Savings with asset value of $320 million is included in the Top 19 BOBs.
Sources: Black Enterprise by B.E. Research June 1993 and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
As shown above in Table 1, based on a rudimentary comparison of the averages of the top
19 BOBs to that of their minority-owned and mainstream peers, there are only slight differences in
all of their financial structures.
Competition
As some Blacks emerged into the American mainstream as a result of the advancements
accomplished during the Civil Rights Era, many also sought financial services from mainstream
institutions. Many Blacks opted to obtain their financial services from banks outside of their own
communities. Interestingly, the competitive threat to BOBs was not as a result of mainstream
banks moving into their niche service areas. Instead, the monopolistic position of the BOBs was
dismantled when their own Black customers began taking their business outside of the community
to the traditional banks. Desegregation brought new challenges to BOBs. While more Blacks had
new access to the economic ranks of middle America, BOBs had to compete against better
capitalized and more "prestigious" banks for the "best" Black customers.
Until the 1990 amendments to the CRA were enacted, the act was largely ignored by
mainstream banks. The original act served to only "encourage banks to distribute loans equitably
in all communities they serve" The new law coaxed the banks into compliance by including
stricter enforcement, requiring public disclosure of ratings, and discussing each bank's
performance in meeting the credit needs of the various communities that they serve. These changes
sought to ensure that deposits from the local community would be reinvested for local community
and housing development (National League of Cities, 1991). Since 1990, many mainstream banks
have made commitments to provide credit services of vary degrees to communities of color within
their service area. This heightened degree of compliance by mainstream banks represented the
second major attack against the entire Black banking industry.
To a lesser extent, non-bank competitors have also stolen market share from BOBs.
Check cashing businesses have often been cited as major competitors to BOBs. The fact is that
most customers that use the check cashing businesses are not general users of banking services
anyway. But, by not coming to the BOB to cash checks, the probability of being able to "grow"
individuals into the "retail banking type" (that is a user of checking or savings accounts) is lower
difficult (Smith, 1993). Like their industry peers, BOBs also face increased competition from
other non-bank competitors such as Sears and Dean Witter.
Customer Base
Historically, the customer base for BOBs has been mainly members of the Black
community. Simply, since the abolition of slavery, this community has been undereducated,
underemployed, and denied access to capital. Through the decades, the Black nation has made
advancement through self-empowerment as well as through government sponsored initiatives such
as the 'Great Society Program" and Affirmative Action. Since the Civil Rights Era, many Blacks
have joined the ranks of the middle class, while a few (non-athletes) have even become "Wealthy"
But, while some have eased into the status of the middle class, most Blacks still suffer from higher
unemployment, lower wages, and inaccessibility to needed capital and/or credit. According to the
U.S. Bureau of the Census, over 56% of Black families earn less than $25,000 per year compared
to white families' 29 percent. That is, the median income for Black families in 1992 was only
$21,161 compared to that of white families which averaged at $38,909 (Bureau of Census, 1992).
Due to desegregation, Black consumers now had the option to choose where to live and
with whom to do business. For many, that choice, due to economic or psychological reasons, has
taken them outside of the traditional Black neighborhoods. Many Black-owned businesses,
including banks, have suffered as a result of diminished demand as Blacks from every social class
opt to do business with non-Blacks. Since desegregation, dollar turnaround in Black communities
has become the lowest of any other ethnic group. The challenge, particularly to those BOBs which
choose to exclusively target the Black community is to compete to attract and maintain
relationships with those Black consumers who represent good credits.
While more Blacks may opt to do business with mainstream banks, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston's interpretation of the 1990 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data
concluded that Black and Hispanic mortgage loan applicants were still denied at significantly
higher rates than white applicants. It was determined that a large percentage of the higher denial
rate for Boston-area minority applicants was attributable to their larger level of debt, higher loan-
to-value ratios and weaker credit histories. Despite these differences with white applicants,
minority applicants with 'the same economic and property characteristics" as white applicants
were still subjected to a higher denial rate, (17% vs. 11%) (Munnell et al., 1992).
Banks make money by creating the largest spread between the return on lending and the
cost of borrowing, given some predetermined level of risk. It is contrary to the concept of profit
maximization for any bank to deny a "good" loan due to the applicant's race, holding all other
things equal. While this discrimination does occur, it is not the norm. Banks, on average, are not
going to turn down a perfect application due to race. The higher denial rate for minority applicants
seems to occur because of perceived flaws in their applications. It should be noted that the
majority of all applications, regardless of race, are imperfect. In fact, less than 20% of all loan
applicants are flawless (Munnell et al., 1992). Thus, discretion by the loan officer becomes a
decision-making tool in the loan review process. It is at this point that the average minority
applicant is denied the loan not because their application is unacceptable but perhaps because of
the biases or prejudices of the loan officer.
Widespread discrimination on the part of loan officers is certainly not the only factor
distorting the attractiveness of Black applicants. Lenders also use benchmarks established by the
federal regulators like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for selling into the secondary market for
mortgages. Normally, banks can maintain liquidity and reduce their portfolio's credit risk level by
either selling whole or parts of individual or bundled loans to the secondary market. These markets
are better structured to handle some of the risks faced by banks. But, the markets' standards can
make it difficult for banks to accept obligations from those customers that do not 'fit" the
qualifications. BOBs have frequently find it difficult to make 'fair" deals in these markets due to
their Black borrowers (Munnell et al., 1992).
Ideally, the secondary mortgage market should act as an "equalizer" for Black customers
with flawed applications because residential mortgages have been relatively safe investments for
banks due to historically low default risks (Smith, 1993). Since this and other secondary
mortgage markets offer another level of safety, it serves to ensure liquidity for both lenders and
investors. Therefore, by dealing in the secondary markets, all banks should find it easier to be more
flexible in accepting flawed applications. It should be noted that the beneficial features of the
secondary market should not be abused by participating in riskier transactions. Instead, the
markets would allow the "fair" valuation of a loan which has the same degree of riskiness as the
standard profile but appears different due to socio-economic reasons.
Market & Regulatory Environment
In an attempt to stimulate the economy, the Federal Reserve Bank implemented a
succession of short-term interest rate cuts. The low interest rate environment of 1991 through
1992 served to rebuild profits and raise new capital for American financial institutions left reeling
after the devastating period known as the Savings and Loans crisis. The rates banks had to pay to
raise funding were now much lower than those they charged to borrowers. This situation allowed
for the creation of large spreads. In fact, many bankers virtually abandoned the concept of acting
as intermediaries. Instead, they boosted their own bottom lines by borrowing from the Federal
Reserve's discount window at 3% and then investing those same funds in relatively risk-free long
term government securities yielding 6-8 percent. This trend of using a federal "subsidy"to borrow
short and lend long had created a new potential threat of excessive interest rate risk within the
banking industry. Rising rates or a flattening yield curve would damage profitability in a similar
manner as the credit crunch of the 1980s had done (Economist, 1992).
While lower rates allowed banks to take advantage of the federal subsidies, these rates also
caused a consumer rush to refinance their mortgages. This call feature of mortgages put banks in a
precarious position. With interest rates at a 27 year low, banks were forced to either sell these
loans at a loss or pay for expensive hedges to cover their exposures. Most banks tried to offset the
losses from refinanced loans by cutting deposit costs. Although deposit rates had declined as low
as 4%, most savers maintained their balances in the banks. Deposits have been a relatively stable
source of funding for banks, even in this low interest environment. If, however, the economy
improved, banks would soon be forced to pay higher rates on deposits and to earn less on their
spreads (Economist, 1992).
The bank regulators, still vigilant from the S&L debacle, turned their attention from credit
risk to interest rate management. In the early 1990s, under the auspices of the Federal Depository
Institution Corporation (FDIC), the FDIC Improvement Act directed the Federal Reserve Board,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC to revise risk-based capital standards
to reflect interest rate risk. The controversial policy used a modified duration to reflect the price
elasticity of balance sheet contracts in response to a small rate change. Any bank found to have
more than 1% of assets in the form of price-sensitive assets or liabilities was considered to be a
'high risk" and thus required to set aside additional capital (Riley, 1992). The act was broad and
imprecise, but the intention was clear. The regulators were going to begin enforcing stricter
interest rate risk management requirements.
BOBs face the same market and regulatory environment as all other banks. BOBs
primarily target Black and other people of color as their main customer base. This is the most
significant difference between the BOBs and other banks. The current secondary market and
regulatory standards make profitable lending to this customer base more difficult. While the top
BOBs fared relatively well through the credit crunch of the S&L crisis period, stricter interest rate
risk management regulations may threaten the BOBs' ability to serve their communities.
Boston Bank of Commerce (BBOC) Case
The structure of this chapter is a mini version of the first two sections of this thesis in that
it covers 1) an analysis of the Black-owned bank, Boston Bank of Commerce (BBOC), 2) its
service area and its credit needs, 3) the regulatory constraints, and 4) BBOC's major mainstream
competitors. The purpose is to highlight the differences between BOBs and their competitors and
how each type of bank deals with the city's community of color. Beginning in 1990, four
mainstream New England banks started to focus their attention on the disenfranchised minority
community concentrated in the Boston area. The following case study was conducted in 1993 as
a client-based, joint thesis between the author and a John F. Kennedy School of Government
masters student (Wilkerson and Williams, 1993). The following is our examination of the role of
the Boston Bank of Commerce in contributing to the development of Boston's predominately non-
White, inner city neighborhoods of Greater Roxbury, Massachusetts (GRNA) during this period of
mounting competition and stiffer regulations.
Boston Bank of Commerce Background
As of year end 1992, Boston Bank of Commerce (BBOC) was ranked as the 13th largest
BOB with assets holdings of $85.6 million. The Boston Bank of Commerce's stated mission is "to
be a strong and profitable institution recognized for providing quality services" that foster
economic development throughout Greater Boston's communities of color, the Greater Roxbury
Neighborhood Area (GRNA). The GRNA is comprised of the neighborhoods of Roxbury,
Dorchester, and Mattapan. The Jamaica Plain and South End neighborhoods of Boston are also
predominately non-White areas in which BBOC has a significant presence.
Mr. Ronald Homer, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, states that the Bank must
effectively respond to the needs of the targeted area and also provide a leadership role without
jeopardizing the bank's credibility as a financial institution. First, the Bank has outlined a multi-
faceted approach to meeting the needs of the community including promoting home-ownership,
small business development, and commercial revitalization. Second, the Bank views itself as a link
between the GRNA community and the broader business community; an advocate that encourages
investment in and ensures that benefits accrue to the neighborhoods and their residents.
An analysis of the Bank's market orientation and primary banking activities support its
stated mission. BBOC's 1992 customer lending profile consisted of 59.5% to Blacks, 25% to
Whites, 6% to Hispanics and Asians and others accounted for 9.5 percent. A geographic
breakdown of BBOC's lending is shown in Table 2 below.
Table 2. Geographic Breakdown of BBOC's Mortgage and Business Loans.
Location Mortgages Business Loans
Roxbury 17 10.70% 23 12.90%
Dorchester 34 21.40% 38 21.40%
Mattapan 22 13.80% 7 3.90%
Jamaica Plain 9 5.70% 6 3.40%
South End 7 4.40% 31 17.40%
Other Boston 7 4.40% 31 17.40%
Boston 96 60.40% 136 76.40%
Elsewhere 63 39.60% 42 23.60%
Total 159 100.00% 178 100.00%
Overall, the Bank's mortgage lending appears to be its most substantial area of operations.
BBOC is consistently ahead of most other area banks and mortgage companies in lending within
the GRNA. These findings are based on an analysis of residential mortgages made between 1989
and mid-year 1992, drawn from 27 census tracts making up parts of the Uphams Corner section of
Dorchester and the northeastern section of Roxbury. Of 137 loans made during that period by
BBOC and the four large mainstream banks, BBOC made 47, or 34.31 percent, see Table 3. But,
the more restrictive underwriting standards imposed by the secondary market limit BBOC's ability
to market its mortgage holdings from the GRNA.
Table 3. Mortgage Lending by BBOC & Its Four Mainstream Competitors, 1989-1992.
Lender # of Mortgages % of Total Mortgages
Bank of Boston 28 20.44%
BayBank 6 4.38%
Boston Bank of Commerce 47 34.31%
Fleet Bank 7 5.11%
Shawmut Bank 49 35.77%
Total 1 137 100.00%
BBOC's primary housing market consists of two to four-unit structures and low- to
moderate income borrowers. The criteria for the secondary market has traditionally restricted
acceptance of these types of properties and borrower profiles. Part of the problem lies in the
difficulty of assessing the stream of rental income generated by the additional housing units. Most
of the housing stock in Boston and including the GRNA is made up primarily of two to four unit,
triple-decker structures. Single family dwellings which are easier to value are extremely scarce.
Couple the valuation difficulty with the lower income borrowers and the result for BBOC is
difficulty in selling its mortgage holdings into the secondary market. In fact, the Bank holds twice
as many loans which do not conform with Fannie Mae's current standards than loans that do
conform. The Bank's inaccessibility to the secondary market has limited the growth of its non-
interest income.
Capitalization and asset structure are both problem areas for BBOC. In 1991, the Bank
had an equity to asset leverage ratio of 4.38% which only marginally exceeded the 4% minimum
imposed by the FDIC. Based on the newly instituted Basel risk-based capital standards, the Bank
will likely experience increased lending flexibility. Though the Bank has been able to increase its
asset holdings, further growth is severely constrained by the necessity to generate capital. BBOC's
asset structure relative to other Black-owned banks (BOBs) within the same asset class of $50 to
$300 million contains more loans than the other banks. BBOC held about 70% of assets as loans
while the other BOB peers averaged only 51 percent. BBOC also held about half the amount of
investment securities as the other banks. BBOC was slow in shifting from loans to investing
during this period of change.
GRNA Customer Base
Poor performance in the New England regional real estate market has substantially
curtailed much of the growth in housing expected to occur through the year 2000. Therefore,
mortgage opportunities are likely to be limited to transfers of ownership (purchase) and/or
refinancing. While the need remains, the development of rental housing in one to four family
structures is expected to decline through 2000. Multi-family and one to four family condominium
conversions, however are projected to increase, continuing a trend toward this type of rental
housing. The low median wages throughout the GRNA continue to present significant challenges
to home-ownership development.
Boston's minority-owned firms and other inner-city businesses, though few in number,
have played a significant role in providing Boston residents and other businesses with jobs, goods,
and services. There are approximately 7,250 minority-owned enterprises within the Boston area.
Forty-four percent are Black-owned, 20% are Hispanic-owned and Asians and other non-Whites
represent 36 percent. Boston's minority-owned businesses are currently concentrated (about 90%)
in the service and construction industries. The minority-owned and the other area businesses
provide over 11,000 jobs to local residents, most of whom (about 70%) live within the GRNA.
Over 60% of sales from local and minority-owned businesses are from within the Boston area, and
38% are from within their own neighborhoods. These businesses are also strong supporters of
each other by purchasing about 60% of their total products from Boston area companies, and 32%
from neighborhood area businesses.
The major barriers to growth and expansion for Boston's minority-owned and area
businesses are 1) the lack of access to capital, financing and business contracts; 2) the need for
technical assistance; and 3) the increase in the level of crime within the area. Over 65% of these
enterprises find obtaining financing for their ongoing operations and/or expansion is difficult, even
at higher costs, or not available at all.
Competition
BBOC's monopoly on credit services to the GRNA has been decimated by the entrance of
area competitors, see Table 4 below. The four largest area banks that have established a presence
in the GRNA are: Bank of Boston's First Community Bank, BayBank's BayBank Boston,
Shawmut Bank and its affiliate Shawmut Mortgage Company, and Fleet Bank of Massachusetts.
All four competitors have a heavy retail orientation. Only Shawmut Bank seems to be a major
competitor in the residential mortgage market. For business lending, again Shawmut stands apart
from the other competitors by lending primarily in Boston's Chinatown neighborhood. The other
three banks rely on their membership in the Massachusetts Minority Enterprise Investment
Corporation to participate in small business lending.
A description of each of the mainstream bank into the GRNA and their stated roles in the
GRNA are outlined below:
Table 4. Bank Facilities Located Within Boston's Greater Roxbury Neighborhood Area (GRNA)
Bank Name 1989 1993
Boston Bank of Commerce 2 2
BayBank Boston 0 22
Bank of Boston - First 0 12
Community Bank
Fleet Bank 0 4
Shawmut Bank 0 15
Total 2 55
Source: Strategic Analysis of the Role of the Boston Bank of Commerce in the Greater Roxbury
Neighborhood Area, Masters Thesis, May 1993.
BANK OF BOSTON-FIRST COMMUNITY BANK. In 1989, the Bank of Boston took the
initiative to establish the First Community Bank as a comprehensive approach to reaching the low
and moderate income inner city markets of Boston. The Bank of Boston is the principal banking
subsidiary of Bank of Boston Corporation, a bank holding company with combined assets, as of
1992, of over $31 billion.
Through its 12 branches and over 100 staff members, First Community Bank (FCB), a
division of Bank of Boston, targets retail lending and banking services to several of Boston's inner-
city neighborhoods, Providence, Rhode Island, and New Haven, Connecticut. In 1991, FCB had
over $250 million in deposits. FCB's product line includes low cost checking and savings
accounts, ATM service, affordable mortgages, property improvement loans, and unsecured
personal loans.
According to Ms. Gail Snowden, President of First Community Bank, the division's goal is
to both increase the Bank's market share and to 'hormalize" their community development
activities into the other more traditional divisions of the Bank by maintaining profitable operations.
Normalization is the process of taking products and services from this special unit of the bank and
implementing them throughout the entire bank. To the Bank of Boston, the value of FCB is
contingent upon the division performing on par with other profit centers within the Bank. To
achieve this, FCB's goal is to generate $25 million in deposits per branch. As an entire unit of
branches, FCB has been profitable since its inception in 1990.
First Community Bank's principal strategy is to dominate the New England urban banking
market through the use of an extensive full service retail branch network system. Prior to the
creation of FCB, Bank of Boston held 7 branches within Boston's inner city. Through Bank of
Boston's acquisition of other banks, FCB has obtained 5 more branches and plans to "grow" 3
more in 1993 for a total of 15 branches.
First Community Bank's primary activity is to provide consumer banking products and
services. The Bank has established what it has termed "conventional banking plus," a variety of
traditional banking products designed to accommodate low to moderate income consumers. These
offerings, First Step Bank products include low fee checking and savings accounts which require
no minimum balances.
Though a strong retail bank, FCB does not appear to place heavy emphasis on residential
mortgage lending. An analysis of residential mortgage data from the period of 1989 to mid-year
1992 reveals that Bank of Boston via its mortgage company made only 20% of all the loans made
by BBOC and its other competitors. However, in the next five to ten years, it is likely that the
Bank will intensify its efforts to capture more of the market share of residential lending. FCB has
already taken the first steps to accomplish this by currently offering mortgages for multi-family
residences to applicants with joint incomes as low as $25,000.
With respect to commercial lending, the Bank intends on being involved in large scale
commercial projects like the Parcel 18/Ruggles Station development. They plan to continue to
pursue these types of projects in consortia with other traditional Boston area banks through MEIC
(Minority Enterprise Investment Corporation, a multi-bank community development corporation)
or through developed "partnerships" with the City of Boston.
BAYBANK-BAYBANK BOSTON. In 1978, BayBanks, Inc. established BayBank Boston,
N.A., to serve the downtown Boston area. By 1990, BayBank Boston (BBB) expanded its retail
banking services to target Boston's inner-city neighborhoods. As of year end 1992, BayBanks
Inc., a bank holding company, and its subsidiaries had a combined asset value of $10 billion.
According to Mr. Grady Hedgespeth, regional President of BayBank Boston, BBB's goal
is to 'fit" the Bank's retail and commercial banking focus to meet the needs of the inner-city
neighborhoods through the balancing of 'high touch" and 'high technology" That is, BBB puts a
heavy emphasis on consumer products and lending coupled with an extensive ATM network
system. Of BBB's 23 facilities within the GRNA, 19 are ATMs with the remaining 3 as full
service branches and 1 loan processing center. In order to complete an extensive 'hub and spoke
system" within the GRNA, the Bank plans major capital investments. The Bank is opening two
branches in the Dudley and Lower Roxbury/South area and a 5,000 s.f. retail banking center in
Dorchester's Field Corner which will house lenders, the human resources department, and the
office of the Regional President.
BBB's principal strategy is to capture a large share of the fee-income activity in the
GRNA through the use of its extensive ATM network system. Each of BBB's ATMs are expected
to yield at least 9,000 transactions per month. The branches serves as the foundation of this
system by providing consumer and small business products and services. BBB is not a serious
small business lender.
Analysis of residential mortgage data reveals that BBB also has not placed a strong
emphasis on mortgage lending in the GRNA. BBB made only 4% of all the loans made in the
GRNA by BBOC and the other mainstream banks. While the majority of BBB's efforts in the
GRNA has been on retail banking, the Bank still intends to be involved in larger scale commercial
lending projects. They plan to pursue these types of projects in consortia with other traditional
Boston area banks through MEIC, local business associations, or through a developed partnership
with organizations such as the Commonwealth Enterprise Fund.
SHAWMUT BANK & SHAWMUT MORTGAGE COMPANY. Shawmut Bank and its
affiliate Shawmut Mortgage Company primarily serve the retail and mortgage lending needs of the
Metropolitan Region which is comprised of Boston's inner city neighborhoods, Cambridge,
Somerville, and Chelsea. In addition to its corporate headquarters, Shawmut has 47 bank offices
in the region with over 2,500 personnel.
Within the GRNA, the Bank has 2 full service branches and 13 ATMs and is planning
another full service branch and mortgage production office. While Shawmut is a retail-focused
bank, its strategy in the GRNA has been concentrated in mortgage lending. Shawmut Mortgage
Company has been the major mortgage lender in these inner city neighborhoods by making about
36% of all the mortgages between 1989 and mid-year 1992.
Shawmut does five times more business in Boston's Chinatown than it does throughout the
entire GRNA. Shawmut's loan portfolio for Chinatown alone is $25 million. The Bank believes
that Chinatown's enterprises, especially those associated with the restaurant industry, are proven
and stable businesses. The primary need for these firms is capital for expansion. With respect to
small business lending, the Bank does not appear to be a major player in the GRNA. While the
majority of Shawmut's efforts in the GRNA are in the area of mortgage lending, the Bank still
intends to be involved in the area's large scale commercial lending projects like the Parcel
18/Ruggles Station development. Their plan is to continue pursuing these types of projects in
consortia with other traditional Boston area banks through MEIC or through organizations like
Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative.
FLEET BANK OF MASSACHUSETTS. In 1991, Fleet Financial Group, a $45 billion
financial service company, acquired the failed Bank of New England. The Group established Fleet
Bank of Massachusetts (FBM) as a wholly-owned retail banking subsidiary. The Bank has a
network of 145 full service branches, and 39 remote ATMs throughout the state of Massachusetts.
Of these facilities, the Bank only has three full service branches and a loan production office
located within the GRNA. Based on FBM's size and extensive system of branches, ATMs,
products and services, the Bank has the potential of becoming a major player in the GRNA.
According to Mr. Ronald Walker, a vice president in Fleet's CRA department, the
division's goal is to make substantial investment in the housing and small business development of
the GRNA. A major aspect of this, he says, is to educate both the Bank and the community to the
problems and opportunities within the area of 'inner-city banking". While the Bank has designed
a $111 Million Statewide Initiatives program for affordable housing, economic development, and
the delivery of banking services, its impact on the GRNA has been mixed. Though the Bank has a
retail banking focus, it continues to have a fairly minimal presence in the GRNA retail banking
market. However, it has taken steps to enter previously untapped banking market locations, as
evidenced by the opening of its first and only bank branch in Egleston Square, Roxbury.
Fleet Mortgage company is a major statewide residential mortgage lender. However,
residential mortgage data from the GRNA during the period of 1989 to mid-year 1992 reveal that
the Bank only made 5% of the loans in the GRNA. Fleet's performance in the GRNA is minimal
relative to its size and capacity. With respect to its small business lending, the Bank has stated that
it intends to also be a major SBA lender statewide. To that end, Fleet has established a
Community Banking Department to handle credits of $500,000 or less for companies with less
than $5 million in sales. It should be noted that with the exception of the Bank's participation in
MEIC, no further evidence suggests that the Bank intends on expanding significant resources
within the GRNA.
Recommendations
The following recommendations were presented to the senior management of the Boston
Bank of Commerce to help improve their performance within the GRNA. These recommendations
were developed based on 1) an assessment of the housing and economic development needs of the
GRNA, 2) the strategies and intended roles of four banks with a presence in the GRNA market,
and 3) an organizational assessment of the Boston Bank of Commerce. Many of the opportunities
and challenges facing the Boston Bank of Commerce are similar to those faced by the other Black-
owned banks throughout the country.
1. Initiate or expand efforts to serve an increasingly diverse market. The demographics of
BBOC's primary service area are changing rapidly. The community's population is shifting from
Black Americans towards Asians, Hispanics, West Indians, and African-immigrants. While Black-
Americans continue to be the predominant non-White group within the GRNA, the Bank must
expand its efforts to reach these other constituencies. Appealing to a broader market will add
diversity to the bank's portfolio and reduce some of the risks.
2. Review asset management. Boston Bank of Commerce holds 68.4% of its assets in loans.
That is, while BBOC is a commercial bank, its asset structure more closely resembles that of a
thrift. Unlike the other BOBs studied, this bank lends substantially more within its local community
of color, the GRNA. The BBOC's portfolio structure has exposed the firm to a higher degree of
credit risk than other banks which lend less.
3. Find the Bank's niche and offer consumer products/service consist with that target market.
The BBOC has not placed heavy emphasis on targeting its consumer and retail banking products to
the low-to moderate income consumers. Also, the Bank has enormous opportunities in the area of
small business lending. Seventy percent of minority-owned businesses, as well as businesses
located in the Greater Roxbury area reported that additional funding/capital was need to finance
ongoing operations and/or expansion. With the exception of Baybank Boston, other competitors
have not opted to provide this type of credit to area businesses.
For the remainder of this thesis, the focus will be on the top ten BOBs and their immediate
mainstream competitors (those non-minority banks that are both located within their geographic
areas and have asset values between $100 - $300 million). The mainstream banks will be referred
to as the " peer" group. The purpose of this structure is to isolate the most successful BOBs in
order to compare and contrast them with their peer competitors. All figures and rates are based on
year end 1992 data unless otherwise noted.
Introduction to Target BOBs & Industry Peers
As of 1992, only 10 of the largest 25 Black-owned financial companies had attained asset
values of at least $100 million. The top 10 are listed below in Table 5. Three of these institutions
are savings banks (highlighted below in bold) and the remaining seven are commercial banks The
combined asset value of the ten "$100 million banks" was only $1.46 billion (Black Enterprise,
1992).
Table 5. The Top 10 Black-Owned Banks, Ranked by Assets, 1992.
Rank Company Location Assets* Loans* Loans/Assets Deposits* Dep./Liabilities
I Carver Federal Savings Bank New York, NY 320,862 246,097 76.70% 252,684 78.75%
2 Independence Fed. Sav. Chicago, IL 239,223 216,293 90.41% 181,708 75.96%
Bank
3 Seaway Nat'l Bank of Chicago Chicago, IL 202,093 56,570 27.99% 168,076 83.17%
4 Industrial Bank of Washington D.C. 186,808 71,116 38.07% 173,807 93.04%
Washington
5 Family Savings Bank Los Angeles, CA 140,113 115,270. 82.27% 114,806 81.94%
6 Independence Bank of Chicago, IL 137,278 41,375 30.14% 121,726 88.67%
Chicago
7 Citizens Trust Bank Atlanta, GA 128,152 53,770 41.96% 117,401 91.61%
8 Drexel National Bank Chicago, IL 127,754 35,210 27.56% 118,482 92.74%
9 First Texas Bank Dallas, TX 110,314 44,967 40.76% 99,709 90.39%
10 Mechanics & Farmers Bank Durham, NC 107,154 69,083 64.47% 94,584 88.27%
1,699,751 949,751 52.03% 1,442,983 86.45%
Savings Banks Totals 700,198 577,660 83.13% 549,198 78.88%
Commercial Bank Totals 1 999,553 372,091 38.71% 893,785 89.70%
* All figures are in thousands.
The BOBs: Performance Measures & Comparisons
The ten largest BOBs have achieved their success through serving their communities'
credit needs in extremely different ways. For example, the two largest Black-owned financial
institutions are the savings banks, Carver Federal and Independence Federal which together
represent 33% of the total asset value of the top 10 BOBs. Along with Family Savings Bank
which rounds out the top five with just over $140 million in assets, these three savings banks
offered significantly more loans and held less deposits, as a percent of total assets, than the top
Black-owned commercial banks. These savings banks averaged holding 83% of their assets in the
form of loans compared to the commercial banks' average of only 39 percent.
To highlight the dramatic difference between the commercial and savings banks, compare
the second and third ranked banks, Independence Federal Savings and Seaway National
(commercial) bank. Both banks are located in Chicago with the same client base, compete with the
same mainstream banks, and fall within the same asset size category. But, Independence loaned
over 90% of its assets to its customers while Seaway offered just 28 percent. Clearly there is no
one model for successful banking in communities of color.
Methodology
While these three savings banks represent a significant percentage of the top BOBs, their
financial structures are drastically different from those of the commercial banks. In order to
maintain uniformity, the remainder of the analysis will focus on the top 7 BOBs and 12 of their
mainstream peers which are both located within the same geographic communities and possess
$100-$300 million in assets. Each Black-owned commercial bank, with the exception of
Mechanics & Farmers bank, will be compared with other commercial banks from its own city.
Given their comparable asset size and access to the same customer base and environmental
constraints, any significant deviations from the peer averages should illuminate differences in the
strategies adopted and implemented by the Black bank managers.
The following analysis will focus on the areas of profitability measures, lending and
borrowing activities, gap analysis, and exposure to various forms of risks such as liquidity and
interest rate risks. It should be noted that all the financial figures represent only a "snapshot" of
financial conditions and risk exposures on the day of December 31, 1992. The snapshot reveals
the positioning the banks have assumed and how they have performed given the existing interest
rate environment. Also, as banks are not required to disclose off-balance transactions in public
statements, the author did not have access to the types of derivative products that each of the banks
may use. Finally, in 1992, FASB had not yet required banks to mark-to-market the value of
investment securities. Therefore, the true value and risks associated with the investment securities
probably are not accurately reflected.
Analysis of the Top 7 BOBS and 12 of Their Peers
Chicago. The city of Chicago is home to over 2.7 million people (Polk, 1993). Three of the
nation's top Black-owned commercial banks (Drexel, Independence Bank of Chicago, and Seaway
National) compete amongst themselves and with other mainstream competitors within this market
area. Summary figures of profitability measures and gap analysis for the 3 BOBs and 4 area
competitors are provided in the Appendix section. The average of the competitors is labeled 'Peer
Ave." All three BOBs achieved a higher average return on equity (ROE) (19.12%) than the area
peer bank average of 14.29% for 1992. The relatively superior return on assets (ROA)
performance by the BOBs was due to their larger Profit Margin average of 17.09 percent. This
ratio reveals the BOBs' are relatively better at controlling expenses or taxes. The BOBs' lower
Equity Multiplier indicates the use of less debt financing relative to equity than the peer average.
Another measure of profitability is the net interest margin (NIM) which is net interest income to
total earning assets. The BOBs' average NIM outperformed their peers by about 50 basis points.
This confirms that the BOBs' interest earned on investment securities and, to a lesser extent,
interest on loans & leases yielded higher returns than that of the average mainstream bank. This
indicates that BOBs are currently earning more from their portfolio structure than that of their
mainstream competitors. Their advantage is due to the interest rate environment rather than due to
the volume of their earning assets.
The targeted Chicago-area BOBs have achieved this degree of relative profitability over
the benchmark average by acting contrary to the common assertion that 'loans are commercial
banks' major asset and generate the greatest amount of income'(Koch, 1992). As a percentage of
total assets, BOBs invested only about 29% of their assets in loans compared to the peer average
of 47 percent. While the BOB loan volume was dramatically lower than that of their peers, the
BOBs had 1.4x and 2.8x (times) more US Obligations and Other Bonds & Securities holdings than
the peer average, respectively. The difference in the net interest margin between the benchmark
and the average BOB is marginal. But, the non-interest income account which includes trading
activity fees and the provision account serve to widen the difference between the two averages'
bottom line or net income. Fees earned on investment securities were more than double for the
BOBs while their provision account for loan & lease losses diminished net income by a rate less
than half of that of the mainstream average.
The liquidity risk situation is mixed between the peer and BOB averages. While the BOBs
have a marginally smaller total deposit base than that of their mainstream peers, their core deposit
level which is comprised of demand deposits, NOW accounts, and money market deposit accounts
is greater than that of the peer average. This indicates that BOBs are in a relatively stronger
liquidity position due to a lower potential need for attaining new funding. But, the peer average
has proportionately more securities maturing within one year than the average for the BOBs.
Compared to their peers' average of 75%, BOBs held only 67% of their investment securities as
short-term holdings. This reduced level of short-term investment securities and loans threaten
liquidity for the BOBs. If there were a need for additional funding, the BOBs would have less
liquidity to draw from in a timely manner. The remaining long-term portion of rate sensitive assets
include both investment securities and loan products which are mostly fixed-rate interest payments
products with maturities of up to 20 years. And finally, the peer average equity base measure
which is total equity divided by total assets is about 100 basis points greater than that of the
average of the three BOBs. This means the premium on borrowings for the BOBs would be
relatively higher in case of a liquidity problem.
Interest rate risk is usually a primary concern for all banks. Whenever the rates paid on
assets and liabilities don't adjust in unison, the mismatch exposes the bank to fluctuations in
earnings. Unless properly hedged, an unexpected change in interest rates could significantly
impact the banks' interest income and overall profitability. The GAP model focuses on managing
net interest income by measuring interest rate risk over different time periods based on an
aggregate "snapshot" of balance sheet data. The resulting GAP value serves to infer the direction
and amount of change in net interest income due to a one percent interest rate move. The GAP
value is the difference between rate sensitive assets (RSAs) and rate sensitive liabilities (RSLs) for
each time period (Koch, 1992). As interest rates change, the cash flows associated with the rate
sensitive or 'repriceable" asset and liabilities contracts vary. Examples of repriceable assets and
liabilities are investment securities or NOW accounts which mature in one year or less. The
repriced assets and liabilities alter the value of the bank's net interest income and net interest
margin. Fixed-rate contracts, however, do not change in value during this one year period unless
there is a default. And finally, neither non-earning assets nor non-paying liabilities generate
income or pay interest.
The three Chicago-area BOBs and their four peers, all have negative gaps. This means
that they all have more RSLs than RSAs. If interest rates were to increase, the banks' spreads
would tighten and net interest income would decrease as the repriced RSLs' effect on the portfolio
grows larger than that of the new RSAs. Alternatively, if rates were to decrease, spreads would
increase and net interest income would grow. The peers' average GAP ratio (RSA/RSL) was
76% while that of the BOBs' was 64 percent. This indicates that while all the banks held more
RSLs than RSAs, the average peer bank held more RSAs relative to the BOB average bank. The
BOB's hold more fixed-rate, longer term contracts. The effect is a NIM that is 1.06 times larger
than the benchmark. The better NIM margin was driven by the BOBs' larger holding of fixed rate
contracts instead of the more interest-rate sensitive types. The BOBs in Chicago, given their
portfolio structure and the interest rate environment were relatively more profitable than this
sample of their mainstream competitors.
Summary of Chicago-Area Banks. The average of the three BOBs is more profitable than the
sample of four mainstream peers. The BOBs achieved this success through lending less loans and
investing more securities than the average competitor. Given the year-end 1992 financial statement
structure and the interest rate environment at that time, the BOBs portfolio structure contributed
more to net interest income as well as net income. Interestingly, while the BOBs achieved higher
profitability, they also incurred relatively less GAP exposure. This is as a result of their holding of
a larger quantity of high yielding, fixed-rate contracts during a low rate environment than their
competition.
Dallas. First Texas Bank and its competitors vie for market share in and around the city of Dallas.
Summary figures of profitability measures and gap analysis for First Texas and five of its area
peers are provided in the Appendix section. The average of the five competitors serves as the
benchmark. First Texas' superior profitability relative to its peers was driven by a stronger net
interest margin. This spread between interest income and interest expense for First Texas was 1. 15
times greater than of its peers. As a result of its higher net income, First Texas' profitability
measures (ROE, ROA, and Profit Margin) all range from twice to over three times greater than
that of the peer average. First Texas' profitability was due to substantial savings relative to the
benchmark on the interest expense item of 'Interest on Deposits" This indicates that while First
Texas' investment securities and loan holdings achieved similar results compared to the
benchmark, the most significant influence on net interest margin was the smaller obligation to pay
interest on deposits.
As a percent of total assets, First Texas held smaller amounts of both investment securities
and loans than its peers. These accounts produced interest income rates which were only
marginally different. First Texas' provisions account as a percent of total operating income,
however, was about 8 times greater than the peer average. Therefore, the BOB's provision
account had a larger negative impact on net income than it did for the other banks, as a whole.
The remaining assets, the non-earning assets, cash and other assets which includes bank buildings,
represented about 40% of First Texas' assets compared to the peer average of 19 percent. Also,
while First Texas' deposit obligations were .98 : 1 compared to the benchmark, the amount of
interest paid on deposits was only .70 : 1, which resulted in a substantial savings in interest
expense for the BOB.
First Texas held, as a percent of total assets, a slightly smaller total deposit base than that
of their mainstream peers. But, liquidity is relatively strong due to the BOB's higher core deposit
level of 66% compared to the benchmark amount of 56 percent. But, the peer average has
proportionately more securities maturing within one year than the average for the BOBs. The
liquidity gained from holding a larger portion of rate-insensitive deposits is practically eliminated
due to the lack of short-term, rate sensitive investment securities. Compared to its peers' average
of 61%, First Texas held only 7% of its investment securities as short-term holdings. This reduced
level (a little more than a tenth of the peer average) is a serious threat to liquidity for the BOB.
First Texas does hold about 12% or 1.57 times more of total assets in the form of cash and cash-
like holdings than its average competitor. So, while First Texas' current securities holdings are not
in a good position to either take advantage of or protect itself from a sudden shift in the yield curve,
the cash can serve as a cushion. It seems First Texas has sacrificed short-term liquidity in favor of
locking in higher rates on both investment securities and loans which are mostly fixed-rate interest
payment products with maturities of up to 20 years.
First Texas and its five mainstream competitors all have negative gaps. Rate-sensitive
liabilities (RSLs) outweigh rate-sensitive assets (RSAs). As the yield curve shifts, the repricing of
the RSLs will have a larger impact on net interest margin than that of the RSAs. The peers'
average GAP ratio (RSA/RSL) was 87% while that of First Texas was 75 percent. This confirms
that First Texas holds 1.37 times more of its assets in the form of fixed-rate and non-earning
assets. In the current interest rate environment, First Texas' portfolio structure has resulted in a
lower gap and a higher profitability relative to its area peer competitors.
Summary of Dallas-Area Banks. First Texas is more profitable than the sample of five
mainstream peers. The BOB achieved this success through not only lending less and investing
more in fixed-rate assets, but by also holding interest expense to a significantly lower level than its
average competitor. First Texas' portfolio structure was most appropriate to take advantage of the
interest rate environment which existed on December 31, 1992. While profitability was strong,
liquidity for the BOB remained a substantial threat. First Texas has achieved high returns through
the incurrence of higher risks.
Atlanta. In Atlanta, Citizen's Trust Bank, the seventh largest BOB, competes with another area
peer bank for their share of the city's market. Summary figures of profitability measures and gap
analysis for Citizens and its peer bank are provided in the Appendix section. With the exception
of the net interest margin measure, Citizens Trust Bank under-performed its peer competitor on
every profitability ratio. This is due to Citizens' low net interest income and high interest and non-
interest expenses compared to that of its peer. While the net interest margin as a percent of total
assets for the peer was more than twice as large as that for the BOB, Citizen's non-interest
expense and provision were 1.43x and 1.46x (times) larger. The result for Citizens was a net
income to total asset ratio of only 1.44% compared to the peer's 10.55 percent.
Like the other targeted BOBs, Citizens holds about twice as much of its assets in the form
of investment securities than its mainstream competitors. Also consistent with the other BOBs,
Citizens holds a little more than half (of the percentage) of loans than its peer. For example, the
peer bank held 67% of assets as loans and 22% as investment securities. These peer assets derived
55% and 15% of total operating income from interest on loans & leases and investment securities,
respectively. Citizen's portfolio of loans and investment securities only generated 40% and 26% of
fees as a percent of total operating income. But, while the results of this comparison of loan and
investment securities revenues reveal only marginal differences, Citizen's profitability
performance is deteriorated by both the significantly larger non-interest income and provision
accounts.
Citizen's liquidity is relatively strong due to the bank's higher core deposit and cash level
of about 60% compared to that of its peer which is about 38 percent. But, the peer bank has three
time more of its assets that are maturing within one year than does Citizens. This reduced level of
liquid assets poses a serious threat to liquidity for Citizens. So, while Citizens' larger holding of
stable deposits does serve as a cushion against a swift adverse shift in the yield curve, the
disproportionately large amount of fixed-rate assets reduces Citizens' "good" options. Citizens
seems to have sacrificed the safety of a "fatter" liquidity position for the higher short-term returns.
Both Citizens and its are peer competitor have negative gaps. Citizen's smaller gap of
54%, is a result of its larger holding of both fixed-rate assets and liabilities and of non-earning
assets compared to that of its peer. Because of Citizens' holdings, its net interest income, which
does not include the non-earning assets, is still larger than its peer despite the fact that overall,
Citizens' is less profitable.
Summary of Atlanta-Area Banks. Citizens is less profitable than its area peer. This is due to its
larger non-interest income expense and bigger provision account. Citizens lent less and invested
more of its total assets in investment securities than its peer did. Of Citizen's assets, it held 2.7x
(times) more, as a percent of total assets, in fixed, long-term products than its peer. The BOB
attempted to gain higher returns by locking in higher rates, but was unsuccessful in boasting
profitability. Other expenses and provisions 'ate away" the bank's profitability leaving Citizens in
a weakened liquidity position.
Washington D.C. In 1992, Industrial Bank of Washington outperformed two of its D.C. area
mainstream peers. Summary figures of profitability measures and gap analysis for the BOB and 2
competitors are provided in the Appendix Section. Driven by a relatively stronger net income
level, Industrial's profitability was higher on every measure than that of its competitors. While the
peer bank average achieved 98.88% of their operating income in the form of interest income
compared to 88% by Industrial, the BOB was still able to be more profitable. Industrial had
significantly less interest expense and provisions, and 10.6 times more in non-interest income than
its peers. The primary contributor to the non-interest income account is revenue from trading
activities. This indicates that Industrial is currently earning more from its portfolio structure than
its mainstream competitors.
Industrial has achieved this degree of relative profitability by lending less and investing
more in securities than their mainstream competitors. Industrial's interest from securities is not a
larger percent of total assets than interest from loans & leases. Instead, Industrial invested only
38% of assets in loans compared to the peer average of 52 percent. Conversely, Industrial's
securities holdings represented 46% of assets, while the benchmark level was only 24 percent.
Although the net interest margin between Industrial and its peers is only marginal, Industrial's
higher trading activities income and lower provisions drive net income to 1.15 time greater than the
competition's.
The price for Industrial's higher profitability is higher risk in the form of a serious
liquidity deficit. Industrial holds more total deposits but less core or stable deposits than its peers.
Core deposits may serve as a source of additional funding due to their lack of repriceable assets.
The core deposit benchmark level was 64%, but Industrial held only 46 percent. The other factors
creating liquidity problems for Industrial include a low cash level and a smaller holding of short-
term, interest-sensitive securities and loans, RSAs. Twenty eight percent of Industrial's total
assets were rate-sensitive. This is only 64% of the amount of RSAs held by the peer average. The
December 31, 1992 snapshot of financial condition reveals that Industrial sacrificed liquidity to
gain profitability.
As in the other cities, all of the banks have negative gaps. Interestingly, Industrial's gap
ratio is 1.40 times larger than its peers, but its net interest margin (NIM) is also bigger. This
indicates that Industrial holds more RSAs to RSLs and that its assets, excluding the non-earning
accounts contributed more to NIM. Due to Industrial's disproportionately large holdings of fixed-
rate assets and the prevailing yield structure, Industrial was more profitable. But, the BOB was
also more vulnerable to changes in the yield curve due to its higher RSA/RSL or gap ratio.
Summary of Washington D.C.-Area Banks. Industrial Bank achieved higher profitability by
investing more in fixed-rate investment securities and offering less in loans and deposits than its
area competitors. This out-performance was made at the expense of liquidity. But, by year-end
1992, Industrial bank had successfully positioned itself to take advantage of the interest rate
environment.
Chapter Two
The analysis from the previous chapter reveals that the 7 top BOBs all follow a pattern of
lending less and investing more than their peers. All of the BOBs held large quantities of long-
term, higher yield Treasury securities. This finding is interesting in that, with the exception of the
city of Chicago, each BOB is located in different cities with varying housing and business credits
and competition. The only underlying constant for each of the BOBs is their preponderance of
serving the same target customer type, the local community of color. By year-end 1992, the 7 top
BOBs had each implemented a strategy of borrowing large quantities of short-term deposit
products, of making fewer loans, and of investing more in investments than the average commercial
bank.
By taking the aggregate of each city's peer average and BOB average, it can be concluded
that, as a whole, the top 7 BOBs are more profitable than their mainstream peers. The aggregate
summary figures which include the BOB, Mechanics and Farmers are the Appendix section. The
BOBs higher profitability was due to their degree of lower lending and higher investing in longer-
term investment securities. While the difference in net interest margin between the BOBs and their
peers was usually marginal, the savings in provisions and the boost from trading income and other
non-interest income made for larger net income levels for the BOBs. The BOBs' higher net income
drove all their superior profitability measures. The following findings, based on the previous
analysis, will focus on three types of risk exposures that the banks face: liquidity, credit, and
interest rate risk.
Liquidity Risk
The BOBs' higher profitability was accomplished at the expense of liquidity. Liquidity is
the ability to either borrow funding or to have access to assets which are either available for sale or
near to maturity (Koch, 1992). Each of the BOBs sacrificed short-term liquidity by accumulating
larger quantities of longer term, rate-insensitive assets. The BOBs allowed themselves to have less
of a "cushion" against sudden interest rate shifts. If rates were to go up, the BOBs would have
fewer funds available to reinvest at the higher rates. Conversely, if rates were to decline, the
returns on investment securities would decrease while borrowers would refinance loans thus
threatening the banks' spread. But, given enough time, the BOBs can convert these securities into
cash. The characteristics of these government securities such as 30 year Treasuries are well
known, making the sale of these assets at a predictable price relatively easier than most other assets
like a loan. While the 'predictable" nature of the BOBs' investment securities does help to reduce
their exposure to liquidity risk, it should be noted that the longer a security's maturity, the greater
is the liquidity, default, and interest rate risks.
Credit Risk
Due to the magnitude of the Savings and Loans debacle, credit risk had been a primary
concern to both bank management and regulators. The BOBs had managed to diminish much of
their credit risk by investing less in loans and more in government-backed securities than their
peers. The banks held investment grade securities rated Baa or higher which are issued by federal,
state, and local governments and are usually less risky than loans. The BOBs averaged 42.3% and
38.7% of assets in the form of loans and securities compared to the peer averages of 55.5% and
27.2%, respectively. The relative low or no risk inherent in the government securities pool that
banks are allowed to deal in makes that portion of the BOBs' portfolio (about 40% of their
earning assets) safer from credit risk. The overall quality of assets, as it pertains to the likelihood
for default, for the BOBs is higher than their peers. The remaining portion of the BOBs' earning
assets are in the forms of loans.
While the author does not have access to the default rate for the various types of loans, it
may be assumed that the weighted amount of holdings of each type of loan in the banks' loan
portfolios reflects a tradeoff between risk and return. For example, as shown in the summary
figures in the Appendix section, the peer banks invested more of their assets in almost every type of
loan than the BOBs. The only significant exception was in commercial/industrial loans. In fact,
the BOBs chose to invest 2.39x more in business loans than their peers. Business loans are usually
extended to fund working capital needs, expansions or acquisitions, and equipment purchases. The
government's Small Business Administration has a loan program to secure loans in order to
encourage more lending. This SBA backing makes these loans more attractive as it reduces the
bank's credit risk exposure. The BOBs' credit risk exposure from their government securities and
their government backed lending afforded the banks a relatively lower level of credit risk compared
to their peers.
Interest Rate Risk
By 1992, the regulatory emphasis had shifted from credit to interest rate risk. Momentum
was growing to enforce strong rate management standards and to impose high costs on those
deemed "excessive" Interest rate risk is represented by the variability in cash flows as the level of
interest rates change. The asset and liability contracts held by the banks mature at different times
and therefore vary in their relative degree of interest rate sensitivity. All the banks sampled had
negative gaps which indicates that their net interest incomes will increase if rates fall, and decrease
if rates rise. The BOBs held fewer earning assets (loans and investment securities) with maturities
of one year or less than their mainstream competitors. The BOBs' level of rate-sensitive liabilities
was comparable to that of their peers. The BOBs have used short-term borrowing to fund long-
term investing. For the immediate future, changing interest rates will have less of an effect on the
BOBs. But, permanent shifts in the yield curve will have a disproportionately larger impact on the
BOBs as both asset and liabilities contracts are repriced.
The GAP methodology used, while basic, is sound and is commonly used in the banking
industry. The GAP technique is limited in that 1) it is specific to only distinct time intervals, thus
overlooking the impact of repricing on the rest of the portfolio, 2) its calculations are based on
book values, not market values, and 3) it ignores the time value of money. Another technique,
Duration Gap which is a single, comprehensive measure summarizes the total portfolio's exposure
to interest rate variability. Duration models complement the GAP model by overcoming the three
limitations stated above. But, duration analysis is also limited due to its need for 1) an extensive
and sometimes subjective database, 2) a forecast of appropriate rates to discount future cash flows,
and 3) an ability for constant monitoring and restructuring of its duration measures as time passes
or rates change, or both (Koch, 1992) Due to the inaccessibility of needed rate information, the
author's definition of the risk profile is limited to the GAP methodology described in Analysis
section of Chapter One. But, if bank management is unable to afford or comprehend more
complicated models, they should use both of these two techniques to gain a better indication of
their bank's interest rate exposure.
Duration analysis is a means of determining a portfolio's degree of sensitivity to interest
rate variability. It reflects any differential in the timing of asset and liability cash flows (Koch,
1992). More specifically, duration measures the relation between the change in the value of an
asset/liability or an entire portfolio due to a change in the discount (interest) rate. The duration of
a bank's portfolio with n assets of both loans and investment securities, each with market values
of Vi and durations of Di is:
D= (Y- ViDi)/ ZVi
This equation may be used to also calculate the bank's liability and equity durations (Smithson et
al., 1995). If a bank's weighted duration of assets is greater than the weighted duration of
liabilities then a rise in the interest rate would cause net interest income to fall. The rise in interest
rates creates a larger discount rate for the cash flows and thus lower durations. Based on the
bank's current structure, the duration gap is positive meaning the weighted durations of assets fall
by a larger amount than the liabilities. The opposite would be true if the bank's duration gap is
negative. Rising rates would result in an increase in net interest income.
As the author was unable to obtain cash flow and rates for the banks' asset and liabilities
contracts, a thorough duration gap analysis is not possible. But, a back-of-the-envelope method
can be used to serve as an example. The duration gaps of the average peer and BOB may be
derived by applying the same rates that banks paid and received in the maturity gap analysis from
the Analysis section of Chapter One. For the 19 banks sampled, the average term for the cash
flows from both loans and investment securities was primarily I to 5 years. Loans earn higher
rates than investment securities. Averaged over a 3 year period, the durations of the assets of the
peers and the BOBs are determinable by discounting the weighted values of the loans and securities
by the rates given. The duration of the liabilities(deposits) was determined in a similar fashion.
The results of these back-of-the-envelope calculations are consistent with those from the
thorough maturity gap analysis. As shown in Table 6 below, the weighted duration of the assets
for both groups was greater than their weighted duration of liabilities. This indicates that the value
of their assets declines more than the value of the liabilities, in the event of a rise in interest rates.
The difference between the durations of the assets and liabilities is the duration gap (DGAP). The
BOBs have a lower DGAP. Therefore, the BOBs' current exposure to interest rate risk is smaller
relative to their peers.
Table 6. Comparison of the Banks' GAP Measures.
Duration Peers BOBs Maturity GAP: Peers BOBs
GAP*:
DA 2.17 2.13 Rate Sensitive Assets 48.47% 26.27%
DL 0.94 1.03 Rate Sensitive Liabilities 47.22% 40.18%
DGAP 1.40 1.22 GAP Ratio 81.08% 65.97%
Durations: Rates:
Inv. Sec 2.65 Ave. Yld Rate-Var. 8.42%
Loans 2.6 Ave. Yld Rate-Fixed 9.90%
Time Deposits 1 Interest Cost-Var. 3.84%
CDs 1.45 Interest Cost-Fixed 6.00%
* The Duration Gaps were determined using a back of the envelope technique. The estimated durations of each type of asset and liability
contract, shown above, were multiplied by their portfolio weights and then summed.
The BOBs held less of their portfolio in the form of loans and investment securities which
reduced the BOBs' asset duration to below their peers. But, because the BOBs held 88%
compared to the peer average of 81.5% of their liabilities as deposits, the BOBs' liability duration
exceeded that of their mainstream competitors. On average, time deposits represented about 65%
of each banks' total deposits. Due to the liquid nature of these products, their duration was fixed
at 1 year. The remaining deposits were certificates of deposits which had an average term of 2
years. The difference between the BOBs' asset and liability durations was smaller, resulting in a
tighter DGAP than their peers. Since the DGAPs are positive, both the market value of the equity
and the net interest income decline with rising interest rates (Koch, 1992).
To immunize their net interest income from rate changes, the BOBs would need to shorten
their asset duration by 1.22 years or increase their liability duration by 1.39 years. The needed
increase in liability duration was found by solving for x in the following equation:
(deposits/TA)(current liability duration + x) = asset duration
which is equivalent to
(.88)(1.03 + x) = 2.13.
X is equal to 1.39 years. This is also the same as saying the banks can hedge their exposure to
interest rate variability by forcing their gap to zero by increasing their level of RSAs to offset their
RSLs (Koch, 1992).
Chapter Three
By 1992, interest rates were at a 27 year low. The Federal Reserve Bank was attempting
to stimulate the economy by dropping short-term interest rates. Like many other banks, the BOBs
choose to take advantage of the subsidy provided by the government. Instead of extending low
interest loans to their service areas, the banks borrowed from both the Federal Reserve and the
community in order to invest in securities. The banks borrowed from the Fed.' s discount window
at 3% and from depositors (the community) at an average rate of 3.84 percent. The BOBs then
used these borrowed funds to invest in relatively risk-free government securities which were
yielding 6-8% returns. By the end of 1992, the BOBs had positioned themselves to take full
advantage of this risk-free spread situation. But, given their portfolio structure, the banks were in
danger of incurring net interest income losses if interest rates were to rise.
Since the early 1990s, community leaders, regulators, and politicians have been pressuring
mainstream banks like Fleet and Citibank to comply with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)
by expending more resources to meet the credit needs of their local communities of color. As most
of their customers are people of color, the BOBs have more than satisfied the equal lending
standards imposed by the federal government's CRA. But, compared to their mainstream peers,
the BOBs offer significantly less of their assets to the community while investing borrowed funds
(deposits) outside of the community. Through the use of derivative products and a restructured
portfolio, the BOBs could achieve a satisfactory degree of profitability while serving more of
their own communities' credit needs. The following outlines the process that each of the BOBs
could implement to meet the stated objective.
A Strategy for Profitably Extending More Credit
While banks are not in the business of forecasting interest rate movements, the task is
becoming increasingly more important. Faced with rates at their lowest level in over twenty five
years, it seems reasonable to assume that the rates would begin to increase. As indicated by their
gaps, rising rates would have a strong negative impact on the BOBs' profitability. It should be
noted though that the gap technique, while widely used by small banks, is a simple measure which
provides little insight in to how rates will affect the banks' assets and liabilities. As rates change,
both sides of the balance sheet are affected. But, the determination of the actual correlation
between the rate change and each of the accounts requires the use of sophisticated simulation
techniques. For example, a 100 basis point increase in rates may result in: 1) a higher reinvestment
rate for assets that are available or will soon be available; 2) an increase in defaults as customers
with floating rate contracts are unable to afford the higher loan payments; and 3) depositors
demand higher, more competitive rates. The complex nature of bank asset/liability management
places accurate simulation of interest rate vulnerability out of reach for all but the most
sophisticated banks such as Bank America (Knowland, 1995).
To fulfill the dual objective of maintaining profitably while extending more credit to their
communities, the BOBs would have to restructure their portfolios. To achieve this, the banks
would have to move along the frontier to higher returns by incurring higher risks. Assuming that
interest rates are bound to begin increasing during 1993, I suggest that the BOBs offset the
additional risk incurred from lending more and paying higher deposit costs by investing a larger
portion of their assets in corporate bonds. The use of higher yielding corporate bonds will
compensate the BOBs for the risk incurred from lending more to the community.
Shown below in Table 7 are the current and suggested asset allocation structures for the
average BOB. The 'Suggested BOB Average" is based on a reallocation of 10% of the US
Obligations to a 7% increase in loans and a 3% increase in other bonds. The 7% increase in loans
would result in a $10 million increase in the amount of dollars extended by each bank to meet their
communities' credit needs. On average, the 7 top Black-owned commercial banks would provide
an additional $70 million to credit deprived communities.
Table 7. BOB Asset Allocation*.
Current BOB Suggested BOB
Average Average
$ value of $ value of
% of Portfolio Portfolio % of Portfolio Portfolio
Cash 7.38% $10,538,123 7.38% $10,538,123
US 29.20% $41,695,556 19.20% $27,416,256
Obligations
Other Bonds 9.52% $13,593,894 12.52% $17,877,684
Loans, net 42.31% $60,415,718 49.31% $70,411,228
* $142,793,000 is the average value of the seven top Black-owned commercial banks. All figures are based on this
average.
The suggested portfolio is based primarily on the assumption that the banks will be faced
with a rising interest rate environment during 1993. The actual reallocation of portfolio
proportions by each of the BOBs are best determined by senior bank management who are more
familiar with the dynamics of their customer base and their local environment. The figures in the
suggested portfolio represent the results of assumptions made about the average BOB's ability to
maintain profitability while lending more as rates rise. The BOBs' funding costs (deposits) will
increase thus reducing their profitability. The 1992 "risk-free" spread from investing inexpensive
funds from the Fed.'s discount window in long-term Treasuries will also diminish as rates rise. To
offset these reduced spreads, the banks could invest more in higher yielding loans and corporate
bonds.
Compensation for Additional Risk
The allocation of more resources from Treasuries to loans will introduce more credit and
default risks as well as require higher provisions for the banks. Often, the BOBs have difficulty
selling their loan portfolios at competitive prices because their client base is perceived as different
and therefore, more risky than the industry's standard profiles. Those loans that the BOBs cannot
participate (sell) at reasonable secondary market rates, 'tie up"the banks' assets, reduce liquidity,
and increase their cash flows' vulnerability to financial complexities such as defaults and
prepayments.
By distinguishing the difference between their Black customers' perceived and actual
default risk, the BOBs can be more accurate in pricing their products and also better at
understanding the risk inherent in their portfolios. To compensate for the additional risk from
lending more, the BOBs could require that some customers pay a spread of 1.5 to 2 points (instead
of the industry norm of .5 to 1 point) over the Treasury curve. It should be noted that this
suggested high premium over Treasuries is for only those loan applicants that are evaluated as
actually being more risky than the allowed regulatory standard. This follows the principle of
higher risks demand higher returns. Conversely, higher credit quality customers should be offered
competitive rates. Following in the next section is a brief discussion of techniques used to
minimize the banks' exposure to credit risk.
To offset some of the incremental risk from lending while still contributing to profitability,
the BOBs could also shift more of their investments from Treasuries to investment grade corporate
bonds. The corporate bonds yield higher returns. They are also more risky than the government
bonds. The bank regulators have restricted banks to holding only bonds rated by Moody's as Baa
or above or by S&P as BBB or better. While the investment grade bonds are rated as high quality
credits and are 'iegarded as having an adequate capacity to pay interest and repay principal" the
possibility of default is greater than in the case of Treasuries (Bodie et al., 1993). Use of more
investment grade corporate bonds is the best means to compensate the banks for incurring higher
risks from lending to the community.
The use of riskier loans and corporate bonds affords the BOBs higher yields and greater
profitability. The risks introduced to the BOB's relatively low risk portfolio can be managed
through the use of sound banking practices as well as through the incorporation of derivative tools.
The most critical component of their risk management effort is the definition of risk.
Unfortunately, as discussed above, most small banks lack the in-house resources necessary to
accurately determine their exposure to interest rate and other risks. In these cases, the small bank's
best resource is their ability to maintain close relations with their communities and to understand
the risks and opportunities that they represent.
Use of bank asset/liability management software programs, such as Sendero, which use
simulation models are becoming more popular with the low end of the banking industry
(Knowland, 1995). These programs include models which simulate the bank's net interest income
under various rate scenarios, shifts in portfolio composition, and fluctuations in prepayment and
early withdrawal behavior. Other software features may include a hedge package of off-balance
sheet accounts such as swap or futures. At a cost beginning at about $10,000, these simulation
software programs (used in addition to gap) can assess the bank's risks that may exist as a result
of a particular business strategy (Halliday, 1995).
The BOBs' Credit Risk Exposure
Due to increased lending and the use of corporate bonds, the BOBs will incur higher
exposure to credit risk than in their 1992 portfolio, Unlike interest rate or liquidity risk, there is no
financial product that can transfer away a bank's credit risk exposure. There are other means that
banks can use to minimize their exposure to defaults. The BOBs have chosen to avoid credit risk
by limiting their lending to primarily the government and government-backed borrowers. Other
traditional methods include participating individual loans, holding higher provisions, diversifying
the loan portfolio, and securitizing the entire loan portfolio.
The best way to minimize risk is to avoid it. The next best alternative is to manage risk by
properly assessing it and then to handling appropriately. As discussed earlier, BOBs should
capitalize on their understanding of their communities. There seems to be a difference between the
commonly perceived risk of lending to Blacks and the actual risk. As revealed by the 1990 Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act study, significantly more Blacks and Hispanics with similar economic
and property characteristics as Whites were denied loans. At the same time, the Boston Bank of
Commerce case study showed that given the appropriate attention, banking in communities of color
can be quite profitable. These examples prove that credit quality Blacks do exist and that they can
generate higher returns than the BOBs' investment in Treasuries. While increased lending will
surely introduce more credit risk into the BOBs' portfolios, the use of proper risk assessment and
management techniques will serve to minimize the banks' degree of exposure.
The BOBs' Interest Rate Exposure
Interest rate risk is a major concern for banks. As indicated by both the maturity and
duration gaps, the BOBs' current structures expose them to some net interest income variability.
Based on the current BOB average portfolio, the bank's net interest income is $6.9 million.
Suppose the yield curve were to shift up by 1% and one fourth of the BOB's loans and securities
had matured and been replaced with new assets at the new higher rate of 10.9 percent, refer to
Table 7 (BOB Asset Allocation, above). The interest earned would be:
current rate * (% of "non-maturing" assets x earning assets) + (% of maturing assets x earning assets) or
9.9% * (.75 x $115.7 million) + 10.9% * (.25 x $115.7 million) = $11.7 million.
But, the BOBs would also have to pay depositors higher, more competitive rates:
5.0% x (142.9 million x .88) = $6.3 million.
Therefore, a 1% increase in the interest rate has resulted in a new net interest income of
only $5.4 million which is 21% less than before the rate shift.
The banks' cash flows are mismatched due to holding longer term assets and shorter term
liabilities. To counter this situation, the banks could simply invest more in shorter term securities
or make more loans with shorter matuirites. But the spreads on short term securities, in the current
falling rate environment, would be smaller. Also, the underwriting costs of doing short term loans
would make this option unattractive as well. Rather than adjusting the banks' portfolio structure to
manage interest rate risk, a variety of derivative products may be used. These tools could serve to
neutralize the BOBs' cash flow mismatches by synthetically shortening the payoffs from their asset
portfolio to better match the duration or maturity of their liability structure.
Interest rate futures are contracts between two parties to buy or sell a standardized
financial asset at a specified time in the future. As the BOBs need to be hedged from an increase in
interest rates, they will assume the role of seller and short futures. Therefore, in the event that
rates rise, the net interest income loss due to the banks' mismatched portfolio structure will be
offset by the gains from the fallen futures price. To achieve this, the BOBs should sell futures
contracts on securities with similar "cash market risk" exposure. Since the average BOB is
currently long in primarily 1 to 5 year Treasury bonds, they should short Treasury futures with the
same maturities. Treasury bonds currently represent about 30% of the average BOB's total value.
Using interest rate futures as a complete hedge will reduce the portfolio's interest rate exposure.
But, the total return to the BOB from fully hedging this position would be just the risk-free rate.
By shorting the futures contracts against the underlying exposure of rising interest rates, the banks
will transfer the riskiness of the asset to the buyer of the futures contract. The complete hedge of
the portfolio's Treasury position will leave that portion of the bank assets with no price risk and
no risk premium. Instead of price risk, the BOB would now assume basis risk. But, if the hedge
is held until the maturity date of the futures contract, the basis risk will reduce to zero (Smithson et
al., 1995).
The BOBs can also achieve higher returns than the risk-free rate by using interest rate
swaps. Suppose a BOB receives 9.0% fixed cash flow payments from corporate bonds. To ensure
that the bank gains the "unlimited" upside potential while limiting the downside risk in an expected
rising rate environment, the BOB could swap out the payments it is receiving from fixed to
floating. The BOB and a dealer would negotiate the terms such as maturity and the spread over
Treasury based on the current Treasury note rate and then settle on a price for the swap. Suppose
the BOB is receiving 9% fixed for a 4 year bond. The BOB would want to pay to the dealer the
same fixed rate cash flows for 4 years. The BOB wants to receive from the dealer a floating rate
of Treasury plus some 4 year spread. If the Treasury rate increases, the floating rate cash flows to
the BOB will increase. If the floating rate is greater than the BOB's 9% fixed payment, the bank is
making a profit on the swap. If rates decline or stay the same, the BOB's loss is limited to the
difference between the dealer's floating payment of Treasury plus the 4 year spread and the 9%
fixed rate. See Table 8 below for a diagram of the swap transaction.
Table 8. Swap Transaction to Exchange Fixed Payment for Floating.
Borrower paying fixed 9%
Dealer
receiving fixed
paying floating
-
40
To lock in a spread regardless of interest rate movements, the BOB would do the swap
transaction described above and then enter into another swap. As the BOB would now be receiving
floating from the first dealer, the bank could exchange that floating for a higher fixed rate from a
second swap dealer. The higher second rate would be as a result of entering a longer term maturity
swap than in the first transaction. The longer the term, the higher the rate. By reversing the form
of its payment receipts again, the BOB will neutralize its exposure to interest rate volatility and
lock in a higher fixed rate than the original 9 percent. See Table 9 below for a diagram of these
swap transactions. Two problems arise though. First, the maturity of the second swap is longer
than the actual corporate bond contract. The BOB would have to offset that longer term exposure
by entering into another swap or another bond deal. The second issue is the bank would have to be
certain that the locked-in spread would be greater than the cost of doing both swaps.
Table 9. Interest Rate Hedge with Locked in Spread Using Swaps.
Borrower paying fixed 9% , L
r
BOB
paying floating (Treas. + 4 yr. spread)
receiving fixed 9.25%
Dealer I
receiving fixed
paying floating
4-
Dealer 2
receiving floating
paying fixed 9.25%
Highlighted are examples of how BOBs could increase lending while sustaining
profitability. Credit risk is going to increase as the banks lend more. To minimize credit exposure
the BOBs would have to use the traditional banking methods to avoid or transfer the risk away
from the bank. Interest rate swaps can be used in credit quality spread situations to lock-in spreads
from rate movements. But, if the bank's borrower defaults, the bank's principal is not protected by
using a swap or any derivative product. Swaps and futures may also be used to hedge the interest
rate risk inherent in both sides of the banks' balance sheet. It should be noted that despite all the
advantages that derivative products may afford to the BOBs, these tools are of little value if senior
bank management is unable to correctly quantify the bank's risk exposure. The first step in any
bank's strategy is to understand their own risk position.
Conclusion
Over the past 30 years, the banking industry has undergone dramatic changes. Even more
extreme are the circumstances facing Black-owned financial institutions. While the 1960s ushered
in a period of opportunities for more Blacks to achieve middle class status, desegregation also
brought the flight of Black capital out from their own communities. Black-owned banks (BOBs)
now face decreased demand and increased competition. As demonstrated in the Boston Bank of
Commerce case, the BOBs were once the credit monopolists of their communities. Now the BOBs
are competing against mainstream banks for the minority community's market share. BOBs were
once Black people's only hope for financial services. But today, for many, the BOBs serve only as
their back-up option if denied credit by mainstream banks (Smith, 1993).
The top BOBs were suprisingly similar. They all chose to lend less and invest more than
their peers. In 1992, the BOBs, on average, were more profitable than their peers. They
accomplished this by borrowing from both the Federal Reserve's discount window and the
community (in the form of deposits) and then invested those funds outside of their own
communities. While their net income margins were relatively on par with their peers, the BOBs
achieved higher profitability by holding less in provisions and earning more from their trading
activities. Also, because of the favorable low rate environment, the BOBs managed to incur less
interest rate and credit risk than their peers.
The BOBs must get back to the business of lending if they want to remain profitable. The
government's risk-free subsidy that the BOBs have been coasting on will diminish once rates
increase. And because the BOBs are so heavily invested in longer term asset contracts and shorter
term liabilities, the threat to future net interest income is serious. By investing more in loans and
corporate bonds while reducing their gaps to zero through the use of derivatives, the BOBs can
maintain their relatively superior profitability performance.
Clearly, the BOB's role within communities of color has significantly changed over the last
thirty years. Many would even argue that the BOBs' comparative advantage of having a better
understanding of their communities and the risks they represent has been eliminated. As in the
Boston Bank of Commerce case, Bank of Boston's community bank has a Black president and a
staff comprised of primarily GRNA residents just like the BOB. The effective use of community-
oriented staff and services has made the entrance of many mainstream banks into communities of
color quite successful. This success is due not only to their community-oriented approach. But,
also because these specialized banking divisions are backed by much larger institutions which are
better at diversifying their risks and at leveraging their well established reputations than smaller
competitors.
The BOBs have already turned their attention to the business community. While the
BOBs' total lending rate is significantly less than their peers, the BOBs' do a disproportionately
larger amount of commercial loans. Lending to minority-owned businesses backed by the SBA is
attractive because it minimizes the bank's credit risk and affords the opportunity for establishing
continuing relationships with their customers. The key to the continued success of the BOBs will
depend on their ability to adequately serve the credit need of their business communities. Unlike the
retail banking or mortgage lending opportunities within communities of color, mainstream banks
have chosen to avoid small business lending. As in the Boston Bank of Commerce case, the void in
the availability of credit for small business in communities of color leaves that market open to
BOBs.
By providing needed funding for working capital, expansion, and acquisition activities for
minority-owned businesses, the BOBs can begin to re-establish their positive reputations within
their own communities of color. As the BOBs become more involved in the activities of their
business clients and suppliers, their exposure within the community will also increase. The BOBs
should maximize the benefits of being the "first mover" into this market niche by not only giving
these businesses an opportunity to gain needed credit. But, the BOBs should also offer their
customer competitive rates on loans and other financial services. Clearly the mainstream banks
will pursue small business lending if (or when) they believe that this line of business is profitable.
By entering this business lending market first, establishing relationships, and doing deals at
competitive rates, the BOBs may finally be able to go on the offensive against both fleeing Black
capital and encroaching mainstream competition. Commercial lending is an opportunity for the
BOBs to aggressively alter the communities' perception of the banks without incurring undue risk
to the banks' portfolios.
It should be noted that while some BOBs have inferred that they have often been unable to
obtain competitive rates on the secondary market for their loans, due to discrimination, the actual
problem may be due to the BOBs' small size. According to an officer of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Boston, small banks (which are those banks with less than $500 million in assets) find it more
difficult to obtain competitive rates for their loans in the secondary markets due to the banks' low
volume (Knowland, 1995). Therefore, the BOBs' challenge of obtaining competitive rates for
loans may not be exclusively because of the characteristics of the loan applicants. Instead, the
BOBs seem to share the common problem of being too small of a player to get competitive rates in
the secondary markets.
Finally, the BOBs have to overcome their current situation of being "out of sight, out of
mind" within their market. They should increase their level of lending within their own
communities in order to maintain their strong profitability and to re-establish their reputations as
committed players in the development of communities of color. Lending more to the local
businesses while investing less in Treasury securities (as rates rise) should maintain higher margins
for the BOBs. The financial markets also offer the BOBs opportunities to reduce some of the risks
inherent to the banks' portfolio through the use of derivative products such as interest rate futures
and swaps.
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APPENDIX
Comparison Between Drexel, Independence Bank of Chicago, and Seaway National Bank and four (4)
mainstream banks with assets between $100 to $300 million located in Chicago, IL
All Figures as of Year End 1992
Population of Chicago: 2,783,726
Peer Ave. % BOB Ave. % Difference Times (x)
of TAA of TAA
Balance Sheet (A TA = Total Assets)
Assets:
Cash and Dep.From Banks 4.86% 5.93% 1.07% 1.22
US Obligations 30.98% 41.79% 10.80% 1.35
Other Bonds and Securities 6.50% 18.29% 11.80% 2.82
Loans, net 46.79% 28.50% -18.29% -0.61
Other Assets 10.87% 5.49% -5.38% -0.50
Total Assets 100.00% 100.00%
Liabilities:
Deposits 88.95% 80.23% -8.72% -0.90
Other Liabilities 3.34% 5.03% 1.69% 1.51
Capital 0.40% 0.71% 0.31% 1.77
Surplus (Add. Paid-in Cap.) 6.08% 2.11% -3.97% -0.35
Undivided Profit (R.E.) 1.23% 3.70% 2.47% 3.00
Total Liabilities 100.00% 100.00%
Income Statement (* 01 = Operating Income)
Interest Income: % of Ol* % of 01*
Interest & Fees on L&L 64.56% 32.51% -32.05% -0.50
Interest on Balance w/ Dep. 0.40% 0.00% -0.40% 0.00
Federal Funds Sold 2.58% 2.27% -0.31% -0.88
Dividends & Inv. Securities 26.62% 51.72% 25.10% 1.94
Total Interest Income 94.15% 86.74% -7.42% -0.92
Interest Expense:
Interest on Deposits 40.19% 31.53% -8.65% -0.78
Federal Funds Purchased 0.32% 0.92% 0.60% 2.92
Total Interest Expense 40.50% 32.45% -8.05% -0.80
Other Non-Interest Income 5.85% 13.26% 7.42% 2.27
Other Non-Interest Expense 48.91% 55.46% 6.55% 1.13
Provisions 7.17% 2.86% -4.31% -0.40
Net Income 13.09% 16.93% 3.84% 1.29
Chicago-Area Banks Continued
Performance Measures: Peer Ave. BOB Ave. Difference Times
ROE 14.20% 19.12% 4.91% 1.35
ROA 1.20% 1.35% 0.15% 1.13
Equity Margin (times) 12.61 14.12 1.51 1.12
Profit Margin 14.11% 17.09% 2.97% 1.21
Net Interest Margin 7.21% 7.68% 0.47% 1.07
Equity Multiplier (Total Equity/Total Assets) 8.12% 7.11% -1.01% -0.88
Percentage of Total Assets:
Construction 1.55% 0.47% -1.08% -0.30
Farm 0.03% 0.00% -0.03% 0.00
Comm. Real Estate 3.41% 0.03% -3.38% -0.01
Secured by 1st 10.97% 3.96% -7.01% -0.36
Secured by Jr 0.83% 0.23% -0.60% -0.28
Multifamil Agg 1.69% 2.69% 1.00% 1.59
Nonfarm 14.47% 5.79% -8.68% -0.40
Commlindust 12.98% 14.37% 1.39% 1.11
Individual 2.74% 7.93% 5.19% 2.89
Other 1.64% 0.52% -1.11% -0.32
Total Loans & Leases 50.31% 29.22% -21.10% -0.58
Liabilities as a % of TA:
Money Mkt Accts 5.30% 5.89% 0.59% 1.11
NOW accts 7.28% 8.79% 1.51% 1.21
Total Deposits 88.92% 88.21% -0.71% -0.99
Total Demand Deposits 14.78% 20.89% 6.11% 1.41
Total Time & Savings 74.15% 67.32% -6.82% -0.91
Chicago-Area Banks Continued
Performance Measures
Peer Ave. BOB Ave. Difference Times
Rate Sensitive Assets 32.75% 24.58% -8.17% -0.75
Fixed-rate Assets 50.21% 59.97% 9.76% 1.19
Non-earning Assets 17.04% 15.45% -1.59% -0.91
Total 100.00% 100.00%
Rate Sensitive Liabilities 44.03% 38.24% -5.79% -0.87
Fixed-rate Liabilities 0.59% 0.88% 0.29% 1.49
Non-paying Liabilities 48.68% 53.77% 5.09% 1.10
Equity 6.70% 7.11% 0.41% 1.06
Total 100.00% 100.00%
Rates:
Ave. Yld Rate-Var. 8.42%
Ave. Yld Rate-Fixed 9.90%
Interest Cost-Var. 3.84%
Interest Cost-Fixed 6.00%
Net Interest Income $12,127 $10,167 -1,960 -0.84
Net Interest Margin 7.21% 7.68% 0.46% 1.06
GAP* ($18,637) ($21,304) -2,668 1.14
GAP Ratio 75.87% 63.97% -11.89% -0.84
Comparison Between First Texas Bank and five(5) mainstream banks with assets between
$100 to $300 million located in Dallas, TX
All Figures as of Year End 1992
Population of Dallas: 1,006,877
Balance Sheet (A TA = Total Assets) Peer Ave.% BOB Ave.% Difference Times(x)
of TAA of TAA
Assets:
Cash and Dep.From Banks 7.76% 12.19% 4.43% 1.57
US Obligations 21.20% 19.16% -2.03% -0.90
Other Bonds and Securities 3.70% 3.24% -0.46% -0.88
Loans, net 56.20% 39.32% -16.89% -0.70
Other Assets 11.15% 26.10% 14.95% 2.34
Total Assets 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1.00
Liabilities:
Deposits 92.44% 90.39% -2.05% -0.98
Other Liabilities 1.84% 0.84% -1.00% -0.46
Capital 1.87% 1.13% -0.74% -0.61
Surplus (Add. Paid-in Cap.) 4.04% 4.53% 0.49% 1.12
Undivided Profit (R.E.) -0.20% 3.10% 3.30% 15.66
Total Liabilities 100.00% 100.00%
Income Statement (* 01 = Operating Income)
Interest Income: % of Ol* % of Ol*
Interest & Fees on L&L 67.26% 62.94% -4.32% -0.94
Interest on Balance w/ Dep. 0.09% 3.55% 3.46% 40.43
Federal Funds Sold 3.26% 6.71% 3.45% 2.06
Dividends & Inv. Securities 17.95% 20.24% 2.29% 1.13
Total Interest Income 88.55% 93.44% 4.88% 1.06
Interest Expense:
Interest on Deposits 37.03% 26.01% -11.02% 0.70
Federal Funds Purchased 0.72% 0.00% -0.72% 0.00
Total Interest Expense 37.75% 26.38% -11.38% 0.70
Other Non-Interest Income 11.45% 6.56% -4.88% 0.57
Other Non-interest Expense 68.34% 68.27% -0.07% 1.00
Provisions 0.92% 7.38% 6.45% 7.98
Net Income 6.02% 18.42% 12.40% 3.06
Dallas-Area Banks Continued
Performance Measures
Peer Ave. BOB Ave. Difference Times(x)
ROE 7.69% 14.33% 6.63% 1.86
ROA 0.43% 1.26% 0.82% 2.90
Equity Margin (times) 18.67 11.40 -7.27 -0.61
Profit Margin 5.90% 18.42% 12.51% 3.12
Net Interest Margin 5.82% 6.68% 0.85% 1.15
Total Equity/Total Assets 5.98% 8.77% 2.78% 1.47
Percentage of Total Assets:
Construction 3.29% 1.19% -2.10% -0.36
Farm 0.12% 0.00% -0.12% 0.00
Comm. Real Estate 0.02% 0.00% -0.02% 0.00
Secured by 1st 24.08% 5.04% -19.03% -0.21
Secured by Jr 1.74% 0.02% -1.72% -0.01
Multifamil Agg 1.73% 0.64% -1.09% -0.37
Nonfarm 9.50% 10.62% 1.12% 1.12
Comm/Indust 6.26% 18.86% 12.60% 3.01
Individual 5.47% 3.79% -1.68% -0.69
Other 4.49% 0.13% -4.36% -0.03
Total Loans & Leases 56.34% 40.29% -16.05% -0.72
Liabilities as a % of TA:
Money Mkt Accts 21.32% 18.48% -2.84% -0.87
NOW accts 12.57% 7.81% -4.76% -0.62
Total Deposits 91.96% 90.37% -1.60% -0.98
Total Demand Deposits 21.67% 39.72% 18.05% 1.83
Total Time & Savings 70.29% 50.65% -19.64% -0.72
Dallas-Area Banks Continued
Performance Measures
Rate Sensitive Assets Peer Ave. BOB Ave. Difference Times(x)
Fixed-rate Assets 49.01% 30.36% -18.65% -0.62
Non-earning Assets 23.79% 32.15% 8.37% 1.35
Total 27.20% 37.49% 10.29% 1.38
100.00% 100.00%
Rate Sensitive Liabilities
Fixed-rate Liabilities 56.56% 40.63% -15.93% -0.72
Non-paying Liabilities 0.82% 0.09% -0.72% -0.11
Equity 36.14% 50.51% 14.37% 1.40
Total 6.48% 8.77% 2.29% 1.35
100.00% 100.00%
Rates:
Ave. Yld Rate-Var. 8.42%
Ave. Yld Rate-Fixed 9.90%
Interest Cost-Var. 3.84%
Interest Cost-Fixed 6.00%
Net Interest Income $6,482 $4,604 ($1,878) -0.71
Net Interest Margin 5.82% 6.68% 0.85% 1.15
GAP* ($14,882) ($11,335) $3,547 0.76
GAP Ratio 86.39% 74.71% -11.68% -0.86
Comparison Between Citizens Trust Bank and a (1) mainstream banks with assets between
$100 to $300 million located in Atlanta, GA
All Figures as of Year End 1992
Population of Atlanta: 394,017
Balance Sheet (A TA = Total Assets) Peer Ave.% BOB Ave. % Difference Times (x)
of TAA of TAA
Assets:
Cash and Dep.From Banks 4.73% 8.12% 3.39% 1.72
US Obligations 20.57% 22.91% 2.34% 1.11
Other Bonds and Securities 1.42% 18.38% 16.96% 12.94
Loans, net 66.68% 41.04% -25.65% -0.62
Other Assets 6.59% 9.55% 2.97% 1.45
Total Assets 100.00% 100.00%
Liabilities:
Deposits 59.65% 88.27% 28.62% 1.48
Other Liabilities 32.32% 5.38% -26.94% -0.17
Capital 1.51% 1.18% -0.33% -0.78
Surplus (Add. Paid-in Cap.) 4.14% 4.10% -0.04% -0.99
Undivided Profit (R.E.) 2.38% 1.06% -1.31% -0.45
Total Liabilities 100.00% 100.00%
Income Statement (* 01 = Operating Income)
Interest Income:
Interest & Fees on L&L 54.57% 36.90% -17.67% -0.68
Interest on Balance w/ Dep. 0.47% 0.00% -0.47% 0.00
Federal Funds Sold 2.74% 1.52% -1.22% -0.56
Dividends & Inv. Securities 14.74% 26.31% 11.57% 1.79
Total Interest Income 73.08% 64.73% -8.35% -0.89
Interest Expense:
Interest on Deposits 20.84% 21.88% 1.05% 1.05
Federal Funds Purchased 9.28% 0.00% -9.28% 0.00
Total Interest Expense 30.46% 47.36% 16.91% 1.56
Other Non-Interest Income 26.92% 35.27% 8.35% 1.31
Other Non-Interest Expense 50.81% 72.69% 21.89% 1.43
Provisions 5.63% 8.24% 2.61% 1.46
Net Income 10.55% 1.44% -9.11% -0.14
Atlanta-Area Banks Continued
Performance Measures
Peer Ave.% BOB Ave. % Difference Times (x)
of TAA of TAA
ROE 14.71% 2.12% -12.58% -0.14
ROA 1.16% 0.13% -1.02% -0.12
Equity Margin (times) 12.61 15.76 3.15 1.25
Profit Margin 21.07% 16.86% -4.21% -0.80
Net Interest Margin 6.11% 7.32% 1.22% 1.20
Total Equity/Total Assets 7.94% 6.35% -1.59% -0.80
Percentage of Total Assets:
Construction 3.60% 0.49% -3.11% -0.14
Farm 0.00% 0.24% 0.24% 0.00
Comm. Real Estate 2.39% 0.00% -2.39% 0.00
Secured by 1st 11.31% 7.66% -3.65% -0.68
Secured by Jr 0.12% 1.55% 1.43% 13.11
Multifamil Agg 0.20% 0.48% 0.28% 2.37
Nonfarm 7.53% 15.09% 7.55% 2.00
Comm/Indust 19.00% 11.96% -7.04% -0.63
Individual 10.46% 5.07% -5.40% -0.48
Other 12.61% -0.62% -13.23% -0.05
Total Loans & Leases 67.23% 41.92% -25.31% -0.62
Liabilities as a % of TA:
Money Mkt Accts 12.61% 4.26% -8.35% -0.34
NOW accts 5.07% 16.89% 11.82% 3.33
Total Deposits 51.26% 90.94% 39.68% 1.77
Total Demand Deposits 16.53% 30.67% 14.14% 1.85
Total Time & Savings 34.73% 60.27% 25.54% 1.74
Atlanta-Area Banks Continued
Performance Measures
Peer Ave.% BOB Ave. % Difference Times (x)
of TAA of TAA
Rate Sensitive Assets 68.48% 23.58% -44.91% -0.34
Fixed-rate Assets 20.99% 57.34% 36.36% 2.73
Non-earning Assets 10.53% 19.08% 8.55% 1.81
Total 100.00% 100.00%
Rate Sensitive Liabilities 30.99% 43.43% 12.44% 1.40
Fixed-rate Liabilities 1.31% 1.15% -0.16% -0.88
Non-paying Liabilities 60.52% 49.08% -11.44% -0.81
Equity 7.18% 6.35% -0.83% -0.88
Total 100.00% 100.00%
Rates:
Ave. YId Rate-Var. 8.42%
Ave. YId Rate-Fixed 9.90%
Interest Cost-Var. 3.84%
Interest Cost-Fixed 6.00%
Net Interest Income $13,105 $7,515 ($5,590) -0.57
Net Interest Margin 6.11% 7.32% 1.22% 1.20
GAP* ($21,372) ($25,174) ($3,802) 1.18
GAP Ratio 85.94% 54.29% -31.65% -0.63
Comparison Between Independence Federal Savings Bank & Industrial Bank of Washington and two (2)
mainstream banks with assets between $100 to $300 million located in Washington DC
All Figures as of Year End 1992
Population of Washington DC: 606,900
Balance Sheet (A TA = Total Assets) Peer Ave.% BOB Ave. % Difference Times (x)
of TAA of TAA
Assets:
Cash and Dep.From Banks 6.15% 4.89% -1.25% -0.80
US Obligations 20.64% 43.40% 22.77% 2.10
Other Bonds and Securities 3.48% 2.29% -1.19% -0.66
Loans, net 52.40% 38.23% -14.16% -0.73
Other Assets 17.34% 11.18% -6.16% -0.64
Total Assets 100.00% 100.00%
Liabilities: 7.15% 6.23% -0.92% -0.87
Deposits 85.08% 93.39% 8.31% 1.10
Other Liabilities 7.77% 0.38% -7.39% -0.05
Capital 2.92% 0.30% -2.61% -0.10
Surplus (Add. Paid-in Cap.) 2.83% 0.64% -2.19% -0.23
Undivided Profit (R.E.) 1.40% 5.29% 3.89% 3.78
Total Liabilities 100.00% 100.00%
Income Statement (* 01 = Operating Income)____________
Interest Income:
Interest & Fees on L&L 70.42% 50.67% -19.75% -0.72
Interest on Balance w/ Dep. 0.00% 0.64% 0.64% 0.00
Federal Funds Sold 7.28% 3.55% -3.73% -0.49
Dividends & Inv. Securities 21.19% 33.27% 12.08% 1.57
Total Interest Income 98.88% 88.13% -10.75% 0.89
Interest Expense:
Interest on Deposits 38.97% 34.36% -4.61% 0.88
Federal Funds Purchased 2.89% 0.00% -2.89% 0.00
Total Interest Expense* 42.49% 34.36% -8.13% 0.81
* includes other int. exp
Other Non-interest Income 1.12% 11.87% 10.75% 10.64
Other Non-Interest Expense 41.21% 46.61% 5.40% 1.13
Provisions 12.06% 9.38% -2.68% 0.78
Net Income 6.22% 7.14% 0.92% 1.15
Washington-Area Banks Continued
Performance Measures Peer Ave.% BOB Ave. % Difference Times (x)
of TA A of TA A
ROE 4.64% 9.30% 4.67% 2.01
ROA 0.34% 0.58% 0.24% 1.68
Equity Margin (times) 15.25 16.05 0.80 1.05
Profit Margin 5.54% 7.14% 1.60% 1.29
Net Interest Margin 6.12% 7.77% 1.65% 1.27
Total Equity/Total Assets 6.88% 6.23% -0.65% 0.91
Percentage of Total Assets:
Construction 1.72% 0.00% -1.72% 0.00
Farm 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00
Comm. Real Estate 1.01% 0.31% -0.70% -0.31
Secured by 1 st 4.96% 14.41% 9.44% 2.90
Secured by Jr 1.44% 0.79% -0.65% -0.55
Multifamil Agg 1.23% 0.93% -0.30% -0.76
Nonfarm 16.79% 12.22% -4.57% -0.73
Comm/Indust 6.92% 81.47% 74.55% 11.78
Individual 2.77% 1.43% -1.34% -0.52
Other 8.41% 0.56% -7.85% -0.07
Total Loans & Leases 52.26% 39.04% -13.21% -0.75
Liabilities as a % of TA:
Money Mkt Accts 35.20% 6.78% -28.42% 0.19
NOW accts 8.40% 14.44% 6.04% 1.72
Total Deposits 84.87% 93.39% 8.52% 1.10
Total Demand Deposits 20.78% 24.81% 4.03% 1.19
Total Time & Savings 64.09% 68.58% 4.49% 1.07
Washington-Area Banks Continued
Performance Measures Peer Ave.% BOB Ave. % Difference Times (x)
of TAA of TA A
Rate Sensitive Assets 43.63% 27.81% -15.82% -0.64
Fixed-rate Assets 32.27% 54.89% 22.62% 1.70
Non-earning Assets 24.09% 17.30% -6.80% -0.72
Total 100.00% 100.00%
Rate Sensitive Liabilities 57.31% 35.02% -22.29% -0.61
Fixed-rate Liabilities 0.30% 0.05% -0.24% -0.18
Non-paying Liabilities 35.52% 58.69% 23.18% 1.65
Equity 6.88% 6.23% -0.65% -0.91
Total 100.00% 100.00%
Rates:
Ave. Yld Rate-Var. 8.42%
Ave. Yld Rate-Fixed 9.90%
Interest Cost-Var. 3.84%
Interest Cost-Fixed 6.00%
Net Interest Income $10,703 $11,963 $1,260 1.12
Net Interest Margin 6.12% 7.77% 1.65% 1.27
GAP* ($30,722) ($13,412) $17,310 0.44
GAP Ratio 76.13% 79.42% 3.29% 1.04
